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Capacity sharinga b s t r a c t
Research on multitasking indicates that central processing capacity is limited, resulting in a
performance decrement when central processes overlap in time. A notable exception
seems to be stopping responses. The main theoretical and computational accounts of stop
performance assume that going and stopping do not share processing capacity. This inde-
pendence assumption has been supported by many behavioral studies and by studies mod-
eling the processes underlying going and stopping. However, almost all previous
investigations of capacity sharing between stopping and going have manipulated the difﬁ-
culty of the go task while keeping the stop task simple. In the present study, we held the
difﬁculty of the go task constant and manipulated the difﬁculty of the stop task. We report
the results of four experiments in which subjects performed a selective stop–change task,
which required them to stop and change a go response if a valid signal occurred, but to exe-
cute the go response if invalid signals occurred. In the consistent-mapping condition, the
valid signal stayed the same throughout the whole experiment; in the varied-mapping
condition, the valid signal changed regularly, so the demands on the rule-based system
remained high. We found strong dependence between stopping and going, especially in
the varied-mapping condition. We propose that in selective stop tasks, the decision to stop
or not will share processing capacity with the go task. This idea can account for perfor-
mance differences between groups, subjects, and conditions. We discuss implications for
the wider stop-signal and dual-task literature.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Stopping prepared but no longer relevant responses is a
simple act of executive control that supports ﬂexible and
goal-directed behavior (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014;
Logan, 1994; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg,
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c).
In the last two decades, response inhibition has received
much attention across research domains. Cognitive
psychologists and neuroscientists have explored the
cognitive and neural mechanisms of response inhibition,developmental scientists have studied the ‘rise and fall’
of inhibitory control capacities across the life span, and
clinical psychologists, neuropsychologists, and psychia-
trists have examined correlations between individual dif-
ferences in response inhibition and behaviors such as
substance abuse, overeating, pathological gambling, and
risk taking (for reviews, see Aron et al., 2014; Bari &
Robbins, 2013; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009;
Logan, 1994; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). Research on
response inhibition has thus become a central component
of the study of self-regulation and behavioral change (see
e.g. Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012).
Most response inhibition studies implicitly or explicitly
assume that stop processing occurs independently from go
processing for most of the time. By making this
Fig. 1. A graphic representation of the assumptions of the independent
horse-race model of Logan and Cowan (1984). On signal–respond trials,
the go process ﬁnishes before the stop process. The gray area under the
curve indicates the probability of a signal–respond trial. This ﬁgure shows
why mean reaction time on signal–respond trials is shorter than mean RT
on no-signal trials: the former is calculated based on the fastest RTs that
escaped inhibition (i.e. the RTs on the left of the vertical dashed line),
whereas the latter is calculated based on the whole RT distribution (i.e.
the RTs on the left and right of the vertical dashed line). SSD = stop-signal
delay; SSRT = stop-signal reaction time.
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estimated. Here we report the results of four experiments
that used a selective stop–change task in which different
signals could be presented; subjects were instructed to
stop and change the planned go response if one of the sig-
nals occurred (valid signal), but to execute the planned go
response if the other signals occurred (invalid signals). Our
experiments challenge the dominant independent race
model of response inhibition because they indicate that
the processes underlying going and stopping can interact
substantially, especially when the stop-signal rules change
frequently. Our results also shed a new light on strategy
selection in selective stop tasks.
1.1. A brief introduction to independent race models of
inhibitory control
Reactive inhibitory control in response to changes in the
environment or internal state is often studied in tasks such
as the go/no-go task (Donders, 1868/1969) and the
stop-signal task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan,
1984; Vince, 1948). In the go/no-go task, subjects are
instructed to respond when a go stimulus appears (e.g. an
‘O’), but to withhold their response when a no-go stimulus
appears (e.g. an ‘X’). In the stop-signal task, subjects per-
form a primary go task, such as responding to the identity
of a stimulus (e.g. press left when an ‘O’ appears, and right
when an ‘X’ appears). On a minority of the trials, an extra
visual or auditory signal appears after a variable delay,
instructing subjects to withhold the planned go response.
Performance in these tasks and their many variants can
be modeled as an independent race between a go process,
triggered by the presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop
process, triggered by the presentation of the no-go stimu-
lus or the stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Cowan,
& Davis, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, &
Wagenmakers, 2014; for a review, see Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009a). When the stop process ﬁnishes before the
go process, response inhibition is successful and no
response is emitted (signal-inhibit); when the go process
ﬁnishes before the stop process, response inhibition is
unsuccessful and the response is incorrectly emitted (sig-
nal–respond). In the go/no-go task, the main dependent
variable is the probability of responding on no-go trials.
In the stop-signal task, the covert latency of the stop pro-
cess (stop-signal reaction time or SSRT) can also be esti-
mated from the independent race model (Logan, 1981;
Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan et al., 2014); this has made
it a very popular paradigm for the study of response inhi-
bition in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience,
developmental psychology, and psychopathology
(Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008c).
The independent race model assumes independence
between the ﬁnishing times of the go process and the stop
process (Logan & Cowan, 1984). The independence
assumption takes two forms: context independence (also
referred to as signal independence) and stochastic inde-
pendence. Context independence means that the go reac-
tion time (RT) distribution is not affected by the
presentation of stop signals. Stochastic independencemeans that trial-by-trial variability in go RT is unrelated
to trial-by-trial variability in SSRT (in other words, the
durations of the go processes and the stop processes are
not correlated). These assumptions should not be taken
lightly because SSRT cannot be reliably estimated when
they are violated (Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 2003;
Colonius, 1990; De Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990).
The independence assumptions can be tested by com-
paring the mean RT for signal–respond trials with the
mean RT for no-signal trials, and by comparing RT distribu-
tions for signal–respond and no-signal trials (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009a). First, the independent horse-race model
predicts that mean no-signal RT should be longer than
mean signal–respond RT: mean signal–respond RT only
represents the mean of those responses that were fast
enough to ﬁnish before the stop signal, whereas mean
no-signal RT represents the mean of all go responses
(Fig. 1). Second, the independent race model predicts that
signal–respond and no-signal distributions have a com-
mon minimum, but later diverge (Osman, Kornblum, &
Meyer, 1986). A review of the literature revealed that the
independence assumptions are met in most stop-signal
studies (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). This conclusion is
further supported by behavioral studies that directly tested
dependence between going and stopping (e.g. Logan &
Burkell, 1986; Logan et al., 2014; Yamaguchi, Logan, &
Bissett, 2012), and by studies that modeled the processes
underlying going and stopping (e.g. Boucher, Palmeri,
Logan, & Schall, 2007; Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, &
Palmeri, 2015; Logan et al., 2014).
1.2. The interaction between going and stopping in stop–
change and selective stop tasks
The independent race model provides a simple and ele-
gant description of stop performance in go/no-go and sim-
ple stop-signal tasks, and it allows the estimation of the
stopping latencies. It has also been applied to the stop–
change task and the selective stop task to study cognitive
ﬂexibility and selectivity of action control in healthy and
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conditions.
In stop–change tasks, subjects are instructed to stop the
originally planned go response and execute an alternative
‘change’ response when a signal occurs (for reviews, see
Boecker, Gauggel, & Drueke, 2013; Logan & Burkell, 1986;
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Experimental, computational,
and neuro-imaging work suggests that subjects ﬁrst inhibit
the original go response (go1) and then execute the alter-
native ‘change’ response (Boecker et al., 2013; Camalier
et al., 2007; Jha et al., 2015; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a;
Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 2008). For example, in a
previous study (Verbruggen, Schneider, et al., 2008), we
manipulated the delay between the stop signal and a signal
indicating which change response had to be executed
(go2). As this delay increased, the probability of stopping
the primary task response changed very little, which indi-
cates that the stop process was not inﬂuenced by the go2
process. This supports the independence assumption of
the race model (see also Logan & Burkell, 1986, who
showed that stopping was not inﬂuenced by go1 process-
ing). However, the latencies of the change response
decreased substantially when the delay between the stop
signal and the change signal increased (Verbruggen,
Schneider, et al., 2008). We proposed that these ﬁndings
were consistent with a serial model (i.e. the go1 response
is canceled by a stop response, followed by the preparation
and execution of the go2 response) or a limited-capacity
parallel model with a capacity-sharing proportion that
resembles serial processing (i.e. stopping is prioritized, so
the selection and execution of the go2 response only starts
properly once the stop process has ﬁnished).
In selective stop tasks, subjects are instructed to stop
their response on some signal trials, but not on others (for
a short review, see Bissett & Logan, 2014). There are two
variants of the selective stop task: in stimulus selective stop
tasks, different signals can be presented and subjects must
stop if one of themoccurs (valid signal), but not if the others
occur (invalid signals); in motor selective stop tasks, sub-
jects must stop some of their responses (critical responses)
but not others (non-critical responses). Most researchers
assume that the decision to stop or not does not interact
with ongoing go processes, as it allows them to estimate
the stopping latency. However, Bissett and Logan (2014)
found that signal–respond RT and invalid-signal RT were
sometimes longer than no-signal RT in stimulus-selective
stop tasks. This suggests that selecting the appropriate
response to the signal may interact with ongoing go pro-
cesses (violating the context independence assumption of
the independence race model; see above). A similar pattern
of results was observed by De Jong, Coles, and Logan (1995)
in amotor variant of the selective stop task: signal–respond
RTs for critical responses and signal RTs for non-critical
responses were longer than no-signal RT. This suggests vio-
lations of the independence assumptions. By contrast, in
their simple stop task and a stop–change task, signal–
respond RT was shorter than no-signal RT (De Jong et al.,
1995), which is consistent with the context independence
assumption of the independent race model.
In sum, going in the primary task and stopping are inde-
pendent in stop–change tasks, whereas dependencebetween go and stop has been observed in some selective
stop tasks (e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2014; De Jong et al.,
1995). The go and stop process may interact when subjects
have to decide whether they need to stop or not. The pres-
ent study tested independence assumptions by manipulat-
ing the difﬁculty of selective stop tasks. If we were to ﬁnd
consistent violations of the independence assumption, this
would have serious repercussions for the application of the
independent race model to such tasks and for the wider
response-inhibition literature.1.3. The present study
In four experiments, subjects performed a primary go
task, such as responding to a digit or letter. On some trials,
a signal could appear on the left or right of the go stimulus.
When the signal was valid, subjects had to stop their
planned response and respond to the location of the signal
instead. Invalid signals had to be ignored. We used a stop–
change task because it could provide us with two measures
of ‘reactive’ action control on valid signal trials: the latency
of the stop response (SSRT) and the latency of the change
response. SSRT can only be estimated when the assump-
tions of the race model are met, whereas the latency of
the change response is measured directly. In other words,
we were guaranteed an index of reactive action control
even when the assumptions of the independence race
model are violated (for an alternative procedure that pro-
vides an index of action control when the independence
assumptions are violated, see e.g. Morein-Zamir, Chua,
Franks, Nagelkerke, & Kingstone, 2006; Morein-Zamir &
Meiran, 2003).
To manipulate difﬁculty in the stop task, we changed
the signal rules that determined whether subjects had to
stop–change or not. In each experiment, there were two
groups: a varied-mapping group and a consistent-mapping
group. In the varied-mapping group, the valid signal chan-
ged every four trials (Experiments 1–2) or every trial
(Experiments 3–4). Consequently, subjects could not prac-
tice the valid-signal rule and the demands on the
rule-based system remained high throughout the whole
experiment. We predicted that this would lead to strong
dependence between going and stopping. By contrast, in
the consistent-mapping group, the valid signal remained
the same throughout the whole experiment. We predicted
that this would reduce dependency between go and stop:
when strong associations between the stimulus and a sin-
gle response are formed (in this case, the stop–change
response), the appropriate response to the signal can be
activated whilst rule-based (or algorithmic) processing is
taking place in other tasks (cf. Kahneman, 2003; Logan,
1979, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977). Thus, stop processing can occur indepen-
dently from go processing for most of the time in the
consistent-mapping group.2. Experiments
In Experiment 1, the primary go task was a number
magnitude task in which subjects had to decide whether
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25% of the trials (signal trials), a colored circle or square
(i.e. the change signal; Fig. 2) could appear on the left or
right of the digit. When the signal was valid (25% of the sig-
nal trials), subjects had to cancel their response to the digit
and respond to the location of the signal instead. When the
change signal was invalid, subjects had to ignore it and
execute the go response as planned. At the beginning of
each trial, we presented a word cue to indicate signal valid-
ity (e.g. ‘RED CIRCLE’). Subjects had to stop and change
their response when the colored shape (i.e. the signal)
matched the word cue. In the consistent-mapping group,
the valid signal remained the same throughout the exper-
iment, but in the varied-mapping group, it changed every
four trials.
Experiment 2 was primarily designed to replicate the
ﬁndings of Experiment 1 with different signals, different
cues, and another primary task. The signals were 3  3
or 9  9 white-and-black chequerboards that could be
rotated (square vs. diamond; Fig. 2). We presented a word
cue to indicate signal validity at the beginning of each trial
(e.g. ‘3  3 diamond’), but we counterbalanced the order
of the cued features1 (Fig. 2). In the consistent-mapping
group, the valid signal remained the same throughout the
experiment, but in the varied-mapping group, it changed
every four trials. In the primary go task, subjects decided
whether a letter (a, b, y, or z; the go stimuli) occurred at
the beginning or end of the alphabet. We used letters
instead of digits to avoid overlap between the go stimulus
and the cue.
In Experiment 3, we reduced memory demands but
increased switch demands. Accuracy on no-signal trials
was quite low for some subjects in Experiment 2 (see
below), so we simpliﬁed the primary go task in
Experiment 3: subjects had to decide whether the letter
(the go stimulus) was ‘U’ or ‘D’. Each trial started with
the presentation of a chequerboard (the cue) in the center
of the screen. The cue was followed by the go stimulus (i.e.
the letter). On signal trials, another chequerboard (the sig-
nal) appeared to the left or right of the go stimulus after a
variable delay. Subjects were instructed to stop and change
their response when the second chequerboard (i.e. the sig-
nal) matched the ﬁrst chequerboard (i.e. the cue); on mis-
match trials, subjects had to ignore the signal and execute
the go response as planned. We expected that presenting
the valid chequerboard at the beginning of each trial would
reduce memory demands. However, we expected switch
demands to increase because the valid signal could change
on every trial in the varied-mapping group. Finally,
Experiment 4 was primarily designed to replicate the ﬁnd-
ings of Experiment 3. In this experiment, we used colored
chequerboards.1 Exploratory analyses (not shown) indicated that subjects in both
groups of Experiment 1 were more distracted by invalid signals that had
the same color as the valid signal (compared with shape overlap or no
overlap). This difference between color and shape could have been due to
the order of the words in the cue (i.e. color–shape), or the relative salience
of the features. To rule out the ﬁrst possibility, we counterbalanced feature
order in the cues of Experiment 2.Initial analyses revealed that the difference between
signal–respond RTs and no-signal RTs was (at least numer-
ically) larger in the consistent-mapping groups than in the
varied-mapping groups of all experiments. Furthermore, in
each experiment we found that the varied-mapping group
was more distracted by invalid signals (compared with
no-signal trials) than the consistent-mapping group (as
revealed by analyses of go accuracy, go RTs, or both).
Finally, the analyses of performance for each individual
also revealed strong similarities between experiments
(Fig. 4). Therefore, we analyzed the data of all experiments
together (total N = 192). This ensured that we had sufﬁ-
cient power (.80) to detect at least medium-sized effects
in the (consistent-mapping vs. varied-mapping)
between-groups comparisons.2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
192 volunteers (48 per experiment) from the University
of Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£5) or
partial course credit. Nine subjects were replaced because
their percentage of correct valid-signal trials was 620%
(two in Experiment 1; three in Experiment 2; two in
Experiment 3; and two in Experiment 4); two subjects in
Experiment 2 were replaced because their percentage of
correct no-signal trials was 680%; and one subject in
Experiment 3 was replaced because of technical issues.
All experiments of the present study were approved by
the local research ethics committee at the School of
Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent
was obtained after the nature and possible consequences of
the studies were explained. The target sample and subject
exclusion criteria were determined before data collection
(based on a pilot study (N = 24) in which we found large
effects of signal presentation in a consistent-mapping
group).2.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli and procedure Experiment 1
The experiment was run on a 21.5-inch iMac using
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The change-signal cues
were the words ‘RED SQUARE’, ‘BLUE SQUARE’, ‘RED
CIRCLE’, and ‘BLUE CIRCLE’ (size: approximately
25  4 mm). The go stimuli were the digits 1–9 (excluding
5; stimulus size: approximately 2  4 mm). The word cues
and go stimuli were centrally presented in a white font
(Courier 20 point) on a black background. On signal trials,
a visual signal appeared 200 pixels (approximately 4.5 cm)
on the left or right of the go stimulus after a variable delay.
There were four different signals (Fig. 2), which varied
along two dimensions: color (red or blue; RGB = 255 0 0
and RGB = 0 0 255, respectively) and shape (square or
circle; size: 7  7 mm). The signals occurred with equal
probability. Subjects responded to the go stimuli (i.e. the
digits) by pressing the ‘up’ (digit > 5) and ‘down’ (digit < 5)
arrow key of a standard Mac keyboard with their right
middle ﬁnger. They responded to the location of the signal
(i.e. the colored shape) by pressing the left (signal = left) or
right (signal = right) arrow key with their right index or
ring ﬁnger, respectively.
Fig. 2. Overview of the go stimuli, corresponding response keys, change signals, and signal cues for each experiment. See Section 2.1 for further details.
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group, the valid signal remained the same throughout the
whole experiment (but the signal-validity mapping was
counterbalanced across subjects). In the varied-mapping
group, the valid signal changed every four trials.
All trials started with the presentation of a signal cue
(i.e. the words), indicating the valid signal (Fig. 2). The go
stimulus (the digit) replaced the cue after 750 ms.
Subjects had to decide whether the digit was smaller or
larger than 5. The digit remained on the screen for
1,500 ms, regardless of RT. On 25% of the trials (signal tri-
als), a signal was presented on the left or right of the digit
after a variable delay. The location of the signal was ran-
domized. When the signal matched the word cue
(valid-signal trials; e.g. a red circle appeared when the
cue was ‘RED CIRCLE’), subjects had to withhold the go
(up/down) response and respond to the location of the sig-
nal instead (left/right). When the signal was invalid
(invalid-signal trials; e.g. a red square occurred when the
cue was ‘BLUE CIRCLE’), subjects had to ignore it and exe-
cute the go (up/down) response. There were 4 possible sig-
nals (Fig. 2). They occurred with equal probability, so only
25% of the signal trials (or 6.25% of all trials) were
valid-signal trials. Valid and invalid signals were presented
after a variable delay (change-signal delay; CSD). The CSD
was initially set at 250 ms and continuously adjusted
according to a tracking procedure to obtain a probability
of successful change performance of .50. Each time a sub-
ject responded to the go stimulus or failed to execute the
change response on a valid-signal trial, CSD decreased by
50 ms. When subjects successfully replaced the go
response on a valid-signal trial, CSD increased by 50 ms.
Subjects were informed about this tracking procedure
and they were told not to wait for a change signal to occur.
CSD for invalid-signal trials was yoked to the CSD for the
valid-signal trials.
At the end of the trial, we presented feedback (on
no-signal and invalid-signal trials: ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’,
‘not quick enough’ in case subjects did not respond before
the end of the trial, or ‘no second response required’ in case
they executed two responses; on valid-signal trials: ‘cor-
rect’, ‘try to stop response to digit’ in case they executed
the go response, or ‘you must respond to signal’ in casethey stopped the go response but did not execute the
change response). The feedback remained on the screen
for 500 ms, and the next trial started after a further
250 ms.
The experiment consisted of 12 blocks of 64 trials (768
trials in total, 48 of which were valid-signal trials). Subjects
received a break after every block. During the break, we
presented as feedback to the subjects their mean RT on
no-signal trials, number of no-signal errors, number of
missed no-signal responses, and percentage of correctly
replaced responses. Subjects had to pause for 15 s.
2.1.3. Apparatus, stimuli and procedure Experiment 2
These were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the
following: There were four different signals (chequer-
boards; Fig. 2; size: 12  12 mm), which varied along two
dimensions: frequency (the number of squares inside the
board; 3  3 or 9  9), and rotation (0 or 45; square or
diamond, respectively). The signals appeared approxi-
mately 4 cm on the left or right of the go stimulus after a
variable delay. For half of the subjects, the word cues were
‘3  3 SQUARE’, ‘9  9 SQUARE’, ‘3  3 DIAMOND’, and
‘9  9 DIAMOND’; for the others, the cues were ‘SQUARE
3  3 ’, ‘SQUARE 9 x 9’, ‘DIAMOND 3  3 ’, and ‘DIAMOND
9  9’. The go stimuli were the letters ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘y’, ‘z’.
Subjects responded to them using the ‘up’ (for the letters
at the end of the alphabet) and ‘down’ (for the letters at
the beginning of the alphabet) arrow keys. We used letters
instead of digits to avoid interference between the go stim-
ulus and the signal cue (which contained 2 digits).
2.1.4. Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure Experiment 3
These were the same as in Experiment 2 except for the
following: we showed the currently valid signal (a che-
querboard) at the beginning of each trial (see above and
Fig. 2). In the varied-mapping condition, the valid signal
changed on every trial. The go stimuli were the letters ‘U’
and ‘D’, and subjects responded to them using the ‘up’
(U) and ‘down’ (D) arrow keys. Due to the randomization
procedure, this experiment consisted of 3 blocks of 256 tri-
als (768 trials in total). Subjects received a break after 64
trials. During the break, we presented as feedback on their
performance for the last 64 trials.
2 Wessel and Aron (2014) found that the more features stimuli shared
with the valid signal, the more they slowed responding. We replicated this
ﬁnding (see Supplementary Materials).
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These were the same as in Experiment 3 except for the
following: There were four different signals (chequer-
boards; Fig. 2), which varied along two dimensions: fre-
quency or the number of squares inside the board (3  3
or 9  9), and color (red or blue; RGB = 255 0 0 and
RGB = 0 0 255, respectively).
2.2. Analyses
All data processing and analyses were completed using
R (R Development Core Team, 2014). All data ﬁles and R
scripts used for the analyses are deposited on the Open
Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/
10871/17242).
Descriptive statistics for no-signal and invalid signal tri-
als appear in Table 1; descriptive statistics for valid-signal
trials appear in Table 2. Inferential statistics appear in
Tables 3 and 4. Consistent with our previous research
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b), we distinguished between
the proportion of correct no-signal or invalid-signal trials
and the proportion of missed no-signal or invalid-signal
trials. However, probability of a missed go response was
generally very low (mean: 0.016, sd = 0.021), and therefore
not further analyzed. As discussed below, the indepen-
dence assumptions of the race model were violated, espe-
cially in the varied-mapping group. Therefore, we did not
estimate SSRT.
2.3. Results
We focused on go performance performance on
no-signal, invalid-signal, and valid-signal trials to explore
dependence between going and stopping. For each group,
we calculated means (Tables 1 and 2) and plotted quantile
averages for the different trial types (Fig. 3).
2.3.1. Signal–respond minus no-signal RT
The independent horse-race model predicts that mean
no-signal RT should be longer than mean signal–respond
RT, and that signal–respond and no-signal distributions
should have a common minimum, but later diverge with
the signal–respond distribution to the left of the
no-signal distribution (Osman et al., 1986; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009a). Here we tested both predictions.
We compared mean RT on signal–respond trials with
mean RT on no-signal trials using a mixed ANOVA with
Group and Experiment as between-subjects factors and
Trial Type as within-subjects factor (Table 3). For this anal-
ysis, we included incorrectly executed go responses (e.g.
when subjects pressed ‘up’ instead of ‘down’) because sig-
nal–respond RTs are usually the fastest RTs (so incorrect go
responses are more likely to occur). Consistent with the
context-independence assumption of the independent race
model, mean signal–respond RT was shorter than no-signal
RT in the consistent-mapping groups (global difference:
43 ms). However, in the varied-mapping group, signal–
respond RT tended to be longer than no-signal RT (global
difference: +7 ms). This difference between groups was
reliable (Trial Type by Group: p < .001). No other interac-
tions were statistically signiﬁcant (Table 3).These ﬁndings suggest dependence between go and
stop in the varied-mapping group, but not in the
consistent-mapping group. This conclusion was further
supported by the comparison of the signal–respond and
no-signal RT distributions (Fig. 3). In the
consistent-mapping group, signal–respond RTs were con-
sistently shorter than no-signal RTs (in other words, the
signal–respond distribution was to the left of the
no-signal distribution). In the varied-mapping group, sig-
nal–respond RT was longer than no-signal RT for the 70–
90 percentiles (in other words, the signal–respond distri-
bution was to the right of the no-signal distribution).
2.3.2. Invalid-signal vs. no-signal trials
If the decision about the signal does not interfere with
ongoing go processes (as most selective stop task users
explicitly or implicitly assume), go performance should
be similar for invalid-signal and no-signal trials. To test
this prediction, we compared go RTs and probability of a
correct go response [p(correct)] for invalid-signal trials
and no-signal trials using a mixed ANOVA with Group
and Experiment as between-subjects factors and Trial
Type as within-subjects factor (Tables 1 and 4).
For the mean RT analysis, we included only trials on
which the go response was correct. Mean go RTs were gen-
erally longer on invalid-signal trials2 than on no-signal tri-
als (Trial Type: p < .001), but this difference was larger in the
varied-mapping group (130 ms) than in the
consistent-mapping group (93 ms; Group by Trial Type:
p < .001). Thus, the varied-mapping group was more inﬂu-
enced by the presentation of invalid signals than the
consistent-mapping group. This could be due to increased
memory demands in the varied-mapping group, rule con-
ﬂict/inertia caused by the frequent switching between
signal-validity mappings (similar to task-set conﬂict/inertia
in task switching; for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010;
Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen,
2010), or both. However, the group differences were more
pronounced in Experiments 1 and 2 than in Experiments 3
and 4 (Tables 1 and 4). As discussed above, we expected
memory demands to be lower but switch demands to be
higher in Experiments 3–4 than in Experiments 1–2.
Therefore, the interaction with Experiment suggest that
the larger interference effects in varied-mapping groups
may be due difﬁculties with retrieving the relevant rule or
cue from memory or difﬁculties with comparing the signal
with the cue maintained in working memory (rather than
switching per se).
RT distributions of no-signal and invalid-signal RTs
should overlap when there is independence between go
and stop. However, visual inspection of the group RT distri-
butions shows the invalid-signal distribution was to the
right of the no-signal distribution. Even the fastest go
responses, which occurred approximately 150–200 ms
after the presentation of the signal, were inﬂuenced by
the presentation of invalid signals. This conclusion was fur-
ther supported by a post hoc ANOVA that contrasted the
Table 1
Overview of go performance on no-signal trials and invalid-signal trials: probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)] and average reaction time (RT) for
correct go responses as a function of Group (consistent-mapping vs. varied-mapping), Experiment, and Trial Type (no signal vs. invalid signal).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
M sd M sd M sd M sd
P(correct)
Consistent mapping
No signal 0.986 0.009 0.962 0.019 0.965 0.022 0.974 0.029
IV signal 0.944 0.074 0.899 0.070 0.926 0.037 0.954 0.052
Varied mapping
No signal 0.976 0.021 0.946 0.035 0.978 0.016 0.980 0.018
IV signal 0.913 0.060 0.822 0.084 0.918 0.050 0.940 0.048
Go RT
Consistent mapping
No signal 664 165 726 131 569 108 597 115
IV signal 730 155 833 134 687 111 671 121
Varied mapping
No signal 695 122 709 110 611 120 624 110
IV signal 807 131 883 104 734 121 731 130
Table 2
Overview of performance on valid-signal trials: Probability of responding on a valid-signal trial [p(respond|signal)], average valid change-signal delay (CSD),
average reaction time for go responses on signal–respond trials (signal–respond RT), the difference between signal–respond RT and no-signal RT (both correct
and incorrect responses were included when mean no-signal RT was calculated), and average reaction time for the change response (Change RT), as a function
of Group (consistent-mapping vs. varied-mapping) and Experiment. Change RT corresponds to the time interval between the presentation of the valid signal
and the left/right key press.
p(respond|signal) CSD Signal–respond
RT
No-signal RT
minus signal–
respond RT
Change RT
M sd M sd M sd M sd M sd
Experiment 1
CM 0.480 0.069 352 172 601 151 63 44 597 97
VM 0.472 0.081 348 145 682 117 12 54 649 84
Experiment 2
CM 0.461 0.070 353 134 679 115 48 72 696 85
VM 0.479 0.076 282 129 741 109 30 73 797 108
Experiment 3
CM 0.490 0.061 253 103 546 86 22 61 682 101
VM 0.503 0.083 272 126 606 109 4 68 667 84
Experiment 4
CM 0.490 0.058 279 122 557 97 41 43 620 64
VM 0.490 0.073 275 124 635 117 12 46 659 137
Note: Change RT was higher in the varied-mapping condition than in the consistent-mapping condition in Experiments 1–2 (both p’s < .001), but the group
differences were not statistically signiﬁcant in Experiments 3 and 4, p = .63 and p = .20, respectively.
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trials for each group. There was a main effect of trial type
in both mapping groups (p’s < .001 after correction for
multiple comparisons). This indicates that in both groups,
the fastest RTs were inﬂuenced by the presentation of
invalid signals. In selective stop tasks and stop–change
tasks, SSRT for healthy and young adults is usually around
250–350 ms (e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2014; Boecker et al.,
2013; De Jong et al., 1995; Logan & Burkell, 1986;
Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008).
Thus, this difference between the fastest no-signal and
invalid-signal trials argues against independence between
go and stop in both mapping groups, but the signal–
respond data and the larger interference effects in the
varied-mapping group indicate that this dependencebetween go and stop increases when the demands on the
rule-based system increase.
The accuracy data were consistent with the RT data:
Subjects made more errors on invalid-signal trials than
on no-signal trials (Trial Type: p < .001), but this effect
was larger in the varied-mapping group (7%) than in the
consistent-mapping group (4%; Group by Trial Type:
p < .001). A closer inspection of the error data (not shown)
indicate the higher error rate on invalid-signal trials was
primarily due to erroneous responses to the location of
invalid signal (i.e. left/right responses). Tables 1 and 4
show that the accuracy difference between invalid-signal
and no-signal trials was generally larger in Experiments 1
and 2 than in Experiments 3 and 4, but the Group by
Trial Type interaction was not inﬂuenced by Experiment.
Table 3
Performance on signal–respond trials was analyzed by means of mixed ANOVAs with Group (consistent-mapping or varied-mapping) and Experiment as a
between-subjects factors and Trial Type (no-signal vs. signal–respond) as within-subjects factor.
Df1 Df2 SS1 SS2 F p p < .05 g2gen
Experiment 3 184 1,022,371 4,900,577 12.796 0.000 ⁄ 0.164
Condition 1 184 197,333 4,900,577 7.409 0.007 ⁄ 0.036
Trial Type 1 184 32,495 318,397 18.779 0.000 ⁄ 0.006
Experiment by Condition 3 184 16,487 4,900,577 0.206 0.892 0.003
Experiment by Trial Type 3 184 12,169 318,397 2.344 0.074 0.002
Condition by Trial Type 1 184 59,959 318,397 34.650 0.000 ⁄ 0.011
Experiment:Condition:Trial Type 3 184 10,813 318,397 2.083 0.104 0.002
Table 4
Overview of the Analyses of Variance of no-signal and invalid-signal trials. Performance was analyzed by means of mixed ANOVAs with Group (consistent-
mapping or varied-mapping) and Experiment as a between-subjects factor and Trial Type (no-signal vs. invalid-signal) as within-subjects factor.
Df1 Df2 SS1 SS2 F p p < .05 g2gen
p(correct)
Experiment 3 184 0.172 0.555 18.998 0.000 ⁄ 0.180
Condition 1 184 0.029 0.555 9.714 0.002 ⁄ 0.036
Trial Type 1 184 0.305 0.226 248.4 0.000 ⁄ 0.281
Experiment by Condition 3 184 0.035 0.555 3.858 0.010 ⁄ 0.043
Experiment by Trial Type 3 184 0.052 0.226 13.995 0.000 ⁄ 0.062
Condition by Trial Type 1 184 0.022 0.226 18.170 0.000 ⁄ 0.028
Experiment:Condition:Trial Type 3 184 0.007 0.226 2.007 0.115 0.009
RT
Experiment 3 184 1,208,409 5,609,615 13.212 0.000 ⁄ 0.173
Condition 1 184 149,897 5,609,615 4.917 0.028 ⁄ 0.025
Trial Type 1 184 1,165,417 162,309 1321.2 0.000 ⁄ 0.168
Experiment by Condition 3 184 19,017 5,609,615 0.208 0.891 0.003
Experiment by Trial Type 3 184 44,102 162,309 16.665 0.000 ⁄ 0.008
Condition by Trial Type 1 184 34,192 162,309 38.762 0.000 ⁄ 0.006
Experiment:Condition:Trial Type 3 184 12,069 162,309 4.561 0.004 ⁄ 0.002
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Fig. 3. Quantile averages for signal–respond trials, no-signal trials, and invalid-signal trials for each group. For this graph, we included incorrectly executed
go responses – e.g. when subjects pressed the ‘up’ key instead of the ‘down’ key. The dashed vertical lines indicate when valid signals were presented (on
average).
88 F. Verbruggen, G.D. Logan / Cognition 142 (2015) 81–952.3.3. Individual strategies
So far, we have assumed that all subjects use a
‘Discriminate then Stop’ strategy to perform the selectivestop–change task (i.e. they ﬁrst select the appropriate
action when a signal occurs; they stop if the signal is
valid, but they complete the go process if the signal is
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
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Fig. 4. Difference scores for all subjects in the consistent-mapping and varied-mapping group for each experiment. The numbers in the graph indicate the
number of subjects per strategy. DDtS = ‘Discriminate then Stop’ strategy, with dependence between go and stop; StD = ‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy
(see main text for further details).
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subjects can also use a ‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy
to perform selective stop tasks (for a review, see Bissett
& Logan, 2014). When subjects use this strategy, they
inhibit the response whenever a signal occurs3, and then
they select the appropriate action: if the signal is valid,
no further action is required; if the signal is invalid, they
restart or re-execute the canceled go response. When the
‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy is used, the context inde-
pendence assumption of the independent race model is less
likely to be violated because the decision about the validity
of the signal is made after the response has been stopped
(Bissett & Logan, 2014).
We categorized each subject’s strategy using the deci-
sion matrix discussed in Bissett and Logan (2014, p. 457):
If subjects use the ‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy, sig-
nal–respond RT should be shorter than no-signal RT, but
invalid-signal RT should be longer than no-signal RT
(because subjects have to restart the response on
invalid-signal trials). If subjects use a ‘Discriminate then
Stop’ strategy, and the decision to stop or not interferes
with going (i.e. dependence between go and stop), both
signal–respond RT and invalid-signal RT should be longer
than no-signal RT. If they use the ‘Discriminate then Stop’
strategy, and the decision to stop or not does not interfere
with going (i.e. independence between go and stop), sig-
nal–respond RT should be shorter than no-signal RT,3 Responses on invalid-signal trials could also be stopped in a bottom-up
fashion. Several studies have indicated that stopping can be primed by
stimuli or stimulus features that were previously associated with stopping
(Bissett & Logan, 2011; Giesen & Rothermund, 2014; Rieger & Gauggel,
1999; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a,b, Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, &
McLaren, 2014; Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008).and no-signal RT and invalid-signal RT should be compa-
rable. To determine whether signal–respond and
invalid-signal RTs were longer than no-signal RT, we cal-
culated for each subject the 95% conﬁdence interval
around their mean no-signal RT; their signal–respond
and invalid-signal RTs were considered to be different
from their no-signal RT if the signal RTs did not fall
within this conﬁdence interval. The outcome of this anal-
ysis appears in Fig. 4.
Most subjects in the consistent-mapping condition (in
which the discrimination was easiest) seemingly used the
‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy, whereas most subjects
in the varied-mapping condition (in which the signal dis-
crimination was hardest) seemingly used the
‘Discriminate then Stop’ strategy (Fig. 4). We observed this
pattern of results in each experiment. When we combined
the data of all experiments, Fisher’s Exact Test for Count
Data revealed that the distribution of strategies across
the varied-mapping and consistent-mapping groups was
signiﬁcantly different (p < .001).
From a strategy point of view, this pattern of results
seems very odd. In the varied-mapping group, the
signal-validity mapping constantly changed, so the
demands on the rule-based system remained high
throughout the whole experiment. Presumably, this should
have encouraged subjects in this group to use a ‘Stop then
Discriminate’ strategy rather than a ‘Discriminate then
Stop’ strategy. After all, ‘Stop then Discriminate’ allows fast
stopping and reduces overlap between demands of the
stop and the go task on the rule-based system. Reducing
the demands should be more important when they are
high, so the varied-mapping group should prefer the
‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy more than the
consistent-mapping group. We found the opposite.
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Performance in various response inhibition tasks is usu-
ally described as an independent race between a go pro-
cess and a stop process. In the past three decades, several
studies have indicated that go and stop processing are
indeed independent for most of their durations. However,
dependency between going and stopping may arise when
subjects are instructed to stop their response for some sig-
nals but not for others. The present study used a selective
stop–change task with a consistent vs. varied-mapping
manipulation to test whether decision difﬁculty inﬂuenced
dependence between going and stopping.3.1. Selective stop–change performance in the consistent and
varied-mapping conditions
The analysis of the data of four experiments showed
that mean signal–respond RT was shorter than mean
no-signal RT in a consistent-mapping condition, but not
in a varied-mapping condition. The presentation of invalid
signals also slowed go processing, especially in the
varied-mapping group. Furthermore, inspection of the RT
distributions indicated that even the fastest responses
were inﬂuenced by the presentation of signals. Based on
SSRTs of previous studies, we estimate that interference
between go and stop processing occurred well before the
stop process was ﬁnished. Combined, these ﬁndings indi-
cate that the decision to stop or not interfered with go pro-
cessing, especially when the signal mapping varied. These
ﬁndings challenge the independent race models for selec-
tive stopping.
Our ﬁndings also shed a new light on strategy use in
selective stop tasks. We categorized each subject’s strategy
using the decision matrix proposed in Bissett and Logan
(2014; p. 457). Most subjects in the varied-mapping group
seemingly used a ‘Discriminate then Stop’ strategy, with
strong dependence between going and stopping, whereas
most subjects in the consistent-mapping group seemingly
used a ‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy. We had expected
the opposite pattern of results.3.2. Capacity sharing in selective stop tasks
The main ﬁnding of our combined analysis is the depen-
dence between going and stopping, especially in the
varied-mapping condition (but note that inspection of
the individual data also showed dependence for some sub-
jects in the consistent-mapping group; Fig. 4). We propose
that the discrimination or decision component of the selec-
tive stop–change task interferes with ongoing go process-
ing in the primary task, and when stop difﬁculty
increases, dependency increases. This effect may be similar
to the dual-task costs observed in the psychological refrac-
tory period (PRP) paradigm.
In the PRP paradigm (Pashler, 1994; Telford, 1931;
Welford, 1952), two stimuli are presented in rapid succes-
sion and subjects are instructed to respond to each stimu-
lus as quickly as possible. The common ﬁnding is that
responding to the second stimulus is delayed when thedelay between the ﬁrst and second stimulus is short,
whereas responding to the ﬁrst stimulus is usually not
inﬂuenced much by the delay (for a short review, see
Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). Dominant accounts of dual-task
performance propose that selecting the response to the
second stimulus does not start before response selection
in the ﬁrst task is ﬁnished (e.g. Logan & Gordon, 2001;
Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Pashler, 1994; Pashler & Johnston,
1998). However, performance in the ﬁrst task can be inﬂu-
enced by the selection of the second response (e.g.
Hommel, 1998; Logan & Delheimer, 2001; Watter &
Logan, 2006). This has led some researchers to propose
capacity-sharing models of dual-task performance (e.g.
Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke, 2009; Navon & Miller, 2002;
Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003). These capacity sharing accounts
postulate that parallel processing can occur, but Task 1 and
Task 2 have to share limited processing capacity. When
Task 1 is prioritized (explicitly or implicitly), most process-
ing capacity will be allocated to this task; consequently,
response selection in Task 1 processing will not be inﬂu-
enced much by the presentation of the second stimulus,
whereas response selection in Task 2 can only start prop-
erly when the response to the ﬁrst stimulus has been
selected. But when the tasks are prioritized more equally,
responding in both tasks will be inﬂuenced (e.g. Miller
et al., 2009).
Based on the PRP literature, we propose a capacity shar-
ing account for performance in selective stop tasks. This is
shown in Fig. 5. The top panel of this ﬁgure depicts go pro-
cessing on no-signal trials; the middle panel depicts go and
signal processing on signal trials in the consistent-mapping
group; and the bottom panel depicts go and signal process-
ing on signal trials in the varied-mapping group. We
assume that the go and signal processes will interact for
their whole duration when a signal is presented.
Furthermore, we assume that processing the signals in
the varied-mapping condition is harder than in the
consistent-mapping condition (for the reasons discussed
above). Consequently, the decision to stop or not will ﬁnish
later in the varied-mapping condition than in the
consistent-mapping condition (indicated by the thick ver-
tical lines in Fig. 5), and go and stop processing will inter-
act for a longer period. This can easily explain the RT
differences between conditions. Fig. 5 shows that signal–
respond RT will be shorter than no-signal RT when the
decision is easier (middle panel), whereas it will be longer
than no-signal RT when the decision to stop or not is difﬁ-
cult (bottom panel). The ﬁgure also shows that the interac-
tion between going and stopping will cause invalid-signal
RT to be longer than no-signal RT, but this difference will
be more pronounced in the varied-mapping condition than
in the consistent-mapping condition. In other words, we do
not have to assume that subjects in the varied-mapping
condition used a categorically different strategy than sub-
jects in the consistent-mapping condition. Our limited
capacity sharing account can explain the RT patterns in
both groups. Note that we have depicted stop-signal pro-
cessing by a single bar, but we assume that many processes
contribute to successfully stopping a response (see
Section 3.5). Here we propose that response selection in
the go task has to share capacity the decision to stop or
Fig. 5. A schematic representation of ‘capacity sharing’ between go processing in the primary task and signal processing. The top panel depicts go
processing on no-signal trials; the middle panel depicts go and signal processing in the consistent-mapping group; and the bottom panel depicts go and
signal processing in the varied-mapping group. Go processing is triggered by the presentation if the go stimulus; signal processing is triggered by the
presentation of the signal. On valid-signal trials, the primary-task response is inhibited when the stop process ﬁnished. For simplicity, we did not depict the
execution components of the change response. RT = reaction time; sr RT = signal–respond RT; ivs RT = invalid-signal RT.
F. Verbruggen, G.D. Logan / Cognition 142 (2015) 81–95 91not, which could involve retrieval or activation of the rele-
vant signal rule, a comparison of the signal with the cue,
conjunctive feature evaluation, or a combination of these
processes. When the signal is considered to be valid, a neu-
ral inhibitory process will be activated. Interactive race
models have shown that at this point, go and stop will also
brieﬂy interact.
We have previously formalized the concept of ‘pro-
cessing capacity’ as a measure of the rate of processing
(Logan et al., 2014): A process has unlimited capacity if
its rate is unchanged when another process enters the
race, whereas it has limited capacity if its rate decreases
as more runners enter the race (see also Bundesen,
1990; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Townsend & Ashby, 1983).
We developed a special independent race model that
describes the race between going and stopping as sto-
chastic accumulators, and examined versions in which
the go process and stop process shared capacity and did
not share capacity. When we manipulated the difﬁculty
of the go task and occasionally presented a single signal
we found that the stop rate parameter was not inﬂu-
enced. This indicates that stopping did not share capacity
with going in a standard stop task (Logan et al., 2014).
Versions of the model in which going and stopping share
capacity might ﬁt the results of the present study better,
so a future goal of our research program is to ﬁt our dif-
fusion race model to the present data.
Capacity as measure of processing rate describes the
consequences, but it does not necessarily describe why
processing rates decrease when extra choice alternatives
are added or when other processes enter the race. We
hypothesize that limited capacity arises from competi-
tion between representations. Biased competition
accounts of visual attention assume that visual process-
ing is competitive: the stronger the response to a partic-
ular object, the weaker the response to other objects (e.g.
Beck & Kastner, 2009; Bundesen, 1990; Desimone &
Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006; Kastner & Ungerleider,2000). Thus, when extra stimuli are added, processing
rates for the other stimuli will decrease. This competition
can be biased in a top-down fashion, allowing people to
focus on task-relevant information. In a similar vein,
many models of action selection assume that multiple
action options will compete, so that support for one
option reduces the (relative) support for the alternatives
(e.g. Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Usher
& McClelland, 2001). Again, this competition can be
biased (e.g. Logan & Gordon, 2001). More generally, com-
petition between representations has been used to
account for limitations in working memory capacity
(e.g. Oberauer, 2009), and the broader difﬁculty of doing
several things at once (Duncan, 2006). In sum, the biased
competition idea seems to provide a general description
of how the cognitive and neural system processes infor-
mation, and for why concurrent processes sometimes
appear to share limited capacity (but see e.g. Navon &
Miller, 2002).3.3. Simple stopping as a prepared reﬂex?
In selective stop tasks (including our selective stop–
change task), ongoing processes interfere with each other.
But several studies indicate that in the stop-signal task
and stop–change tasks in which all signals are valid, the
stop process does not interfere with ongoing go process-
ing (except for a very brief period of interaction near
the end of SSRT; Boucher et al., 2007; Logan et al.,
2015). For example, manipulating the difﬁculty of the
response-selection processes in the go task does not inﬂu-
ence stopping performance when all signals are valid
(Logan, 1981; Logan et al., 1984, 2014). Other studies
showed that stopping in a standard stop-signal task or
stop–change task does not suffer from dual-task interfer-
ence (Hübner & Druey, 2006; Logan & Burkell, 1986;
Yamaguchi et al., 2012). So why did we observe strong
dependence between going and stopping (violating the
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race model)?
Consistent with standard PRP models, we assume that
various forms of action control, including stopping, rely
on signal detection, selection of an appropriate action,
and the activation of the stop response or stopping net-
work (Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). In selec-
tive stop tasks, the selection can be quite difﬁcult,
especially when the signal mapping constantly changes.
By contrast, in stop-signal and stop–change tasks with only
one signal, selection of the appropriate action is very
straightforward. Consequently, stopping will not interfere
much with the primary task.
The idea that selection demands are low in standard
stop-signal and stop–change tasks is also consistent with
the idea that most of SSRT in these tasks is occupied by
afferent or sensory processes (Boucher et al., 2007;
Logan et al., 2014, 2015; Salinas & Stanford, 2013). One
could even speculate that stopping in standard
stop-signal tasks is a ‘prepared reﬂex’ (e.g. Hommel,
2000; Logan, 1978; Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 2012).
Several studies indicate that goal-directed actions may
not require much control anymore once the task instruc-
tions are properly implemented: ‘the components of the
task seem automatic, but the task itself is not’ (Logan,
1978, p. 57). In stop tasks with only one signal, stopping
could be a prepared reﬂex due to the low signal selection
demands. Once the task instructions are implemented (‘IF
signal THEN stop’), the stop process can be triggered eas-
ily by the presentation of the stop signal; consequently,
stop processing and rule-based (or algorithmic)
primary-task processing can occur in parallel without
much dual-task interference (cf. Kahneman, 2003;
Logan, 1979, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977).
We should point that capacity sharing can occur in
stop-signal tasks with a single stop signal. The stop rate
parameters depend on the discriminability, intensity, and
modality of the stop signal (e.g. van der Schoot, Licht,
Horsley, & Sergeant, 2005), which could be interpreted as
a capacity limitation (Logan et al., 2014). Furthermore,
we have recently demonstrated that competition between
visual signals in the go and the stop tasks inﬂuences stop-
ping (Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014), which is
consistent with the idea that stimuli have to compete for
limited processing capacity. Thus, it seems that under cer-
tain circumstances, capacity sharing may also occur in sim-
ple stop-signal tasks.
3.4. Categorically different stopping strategies? Maybe not
Our results are very similar to those observed in previ-
ous selective stop studies. As discussed above, two main
selective stopping strategies have been proposed in this lit-
erature: the ‘Stop then Discriminate’ strategy (also know as
the ‘Stop-Restart’ strategy; e.g. Aron, Behrens, Smith,
Frank, & Poldrack, 2007) and the ‘Discriminate then Stop’
strategy. To distinguish between these two strategies,
researchers have relied on differences between no-signal
RTs, signal–respond RTs, and invalid-signal RTs. But our
analysis indicates that such RT differences could be dueto capacity sharing and the difﬁculty of the discrimination
process. In other words, our study indicates that RT differ-
ences between the groups, subjects, or conditions in selec-
tive stop tasks could be quantitative (i.e. degree of capacity
sharing) rather than qualitative (i.e. different strategies).
This is not to say that strategies have no role in selective
stop tasks. Many studies indicate that people use various
strategies to control their actions (for reviews, see e.g.
Aron, 2011; Braver, 2012). For example, subjects can ‘pro-
actively’ adjust attentional and response-selection param-
eters in the go task to enhance stop-signal detection and
slow down responding (e.g. Aron, 2011; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009b; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014).
Furthermore, task prioritization or task bias can be a
top-down strategic decision (e.g. Logan & Gordon, 2001;
Miller et al., 2009). For example, it may be advantageous
to prioritize the stop process (and allocate more processing
capacity to it) when signals are likely to be valid (see
Bissett & Logan, 2014).
3.5. Implications and practical guidelines for stop-signal users
In the present study, we found strong dependence
between stopping and going in selective stopping tasks,
and we have argued that capacity sharing may also occur
in stop-signal tasks. In other words, the present study
and other recent work indicates that going and stopping
tend to interact when stopping is no longer a ‘simple’ pre-
pared reﬂex. Consequently, the independence assumptions
of the independent race model will be violated. As dis-
cussed in the Introduction, the assumptions should not
be taken lightly because SSRT cannot be reliably estimated
when they are violated. Therefore, we propose that every
stop-signal study that uses the tracking procedure and
estimates SSRT should:
1. Report average signal–respond RT, and conﬁrm that it is
statistically different from average no-signal RT for each
experimental condition.
2. Determine whether differences between conditions
indicate various degrees of capacity sharing.
3. Conﬁrm that signal–respond RT is shorter than
no-signal RT for every subject for whom SSRT is esti-
mated. SSRT should not be estimated for subjects with
signal–respond RTs longer than no-signal RTs. The
number of subjects excluded from the SSRT analysis
should be mentioned.
These ﬁrst three guidelines focus on testing the inde-
pendence assumptions. In addition, stop-signal users
should always report:
1. The probability of responding on signal trials for each
condition
2. The average stop-signal delay for each condition
3. Use an appropriate method, like the integration
method, to estimate SSRT (Verbruggen et al., 2013).
A ﬁnal note concerns the interpretation of the SSRT.
SSRT measures the time it takes to stop a response.
However, it is important to realize that SSRT is a global
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an act of control that results in a response being withheld
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). More speciﬁcally, SSRT
captures the duration of perceptual, decisional, and (inhib-
itory) motor-related processes. For example, previous
behavioral studies and computational work have high-
lighted the role of perceptual processes (see above). Our
study shows that successfully stopping also depends on
decisional processes, such as response selection and mem-
ory retrieval (see also e.g. Logan et al., 2014; van de Laar,
van den Wildenberg, van Boxtel, & van der Molen, 2010).
Finally, when the decision to stop is reached, motor output
or other ongoing processing has to be suppressed (e.g. via a
fronto-basal-ganglia network). Thus, in simple stop-signal
tasks and their many variants, SSRT reﬂects more than
the duration of a single neural inhibitory process, and
researchers should consider at which processing stage(s)
differences between groups or conditions arise (for a more
elaborate discussion of this issue, see e.g. Verbruggen,
McLaren, et al., 2014).4. Conclusion
Almost every stop-signal paper assumes that going and
stopping occur independently. Many papers have provided
direct empirical and computational support for this
assumption. Violations of the independence assumption
have important theoretical implications, and practical
implications for the estimation of the stopping latency. In
the present study, we found dependence between stopping
and going in selective stop tasks, especially when signal
discrimination was difﬁcult. We propose that in selective
stop tasks, the decision to stop or not will share limited
processing capacity with the go task. The limited process-
ing capacity arises from competition between go and stop
representations. The capacity sharing idea can account for
performance differences between groups, subjects, and
conditions. For example, when the decision is difﬁcult,
the go and stop task will have to share capacity for a longer
period, resulting in longer RTs on signal trials. Our account
can also explain why the go and stop tasks are largely inde-
pendent in simple stop-signal tasks, since the decision to
stop or not when a signal occurs is very simple in these
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